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A. INTRODUCTION
I. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF
Governments on whose behalf the Agreement is signed agreed as follows:
The International Monetary Fund is established and shall operate in accordance
with the provisions of the Agreement signed as originally adopted and
subsequently amended.1
To enable the Fund to conduct its operations and transactions, the Fund shall
maintain a General Department and a Special Drawing Rights Department.
Membership in the Fund shall give the right to participation in the Special
Drawing Rights Department.2
Operations and transactions authorized by this Agreement shall be conducted
through the General Department, consisting in accordance with the provisions of
this Agreement of the General Resources Account, the Special Disbursement
Account, and the Investment Account; except that operations and transactions
involving special drawing rights shall be conducted through the Special Drawing
Rights Department.3

1

Articles of Agreement of the IMF; http://www.imf.org/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf .
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
2
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II. THE IMF’S OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the International Monetary Fund are:
To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution, which institution provides the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems.4
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.5
To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.6
To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.7
In accordance with the above objectives, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of member
states.8

4

Articles of Agreement of the IMF; http://www.imf.org/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm.
Ibid.
6
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2003, p. 503.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
5
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In addition, the objectives of the International Monetary Fund are also
explained as follows:
The International Monetary Fund was established to promote international
monetary cooperation, exchange rate stability and to provide temporary financial
assistance to countries in order to help easing the balance of payments adjustment.
The IMF would also loan foreign currency to the states that had problems with
their Balance of Payments. Each member state was required to contribute a
designated amount of quota i.e. one quarter of gold and three quarters of national
currency to the Fund. The amounts of loans were based on the amount that each
respective state had contributed to the Fund. The more a state contributed, the
more it could borrow. The USA was the dominant power with the highest amount
of quotas.
Today the IMF maintains the same quota system and member countries enjoy
the same privilege to borrow even though many are no longer maintaining a fixed
exchange rate. Instead, many countries borrow from the IMF when they become
unable to maintain payments on international debts. The IMF plays a major role in
the global monetary system. The Fund surveys and monitors economic and
financial developments, lends funds to countries with balance-of-payment
difficulties, and provides technical assistance by training members states’
government officials in macroeconomic management, reforming tax systems,
developing central banking and financing systems.
The IMF goals are to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, to assist in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of international trade, and to shorten the duration and
lessen the disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
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The mitigation of wide currency fluctuations is achieved through a complex
lending system which permits a country to borrow money from other Fund
members or from the Fund itself (by way of “SDR” Special Drawing Right)9 for
the purpose of stabilizing the relationship of its currency to other world
currencies.
Based on the IMF’s objectives and its operations we can notice that they fit
mostly. As we go about our daily lives, it is easy to overlook the importance of
international trade. For example, America ships enormous volumes of food,
airplanes, machinery and computers to other countries, while in return it gets
other goods and services.
That’s why the IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the
international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international
payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to buy goods and services
from each other. This is essential for sustainable economic growth and rising
living standards and that’s why monetary stability was to be considered important.
To maintain stability and prevent crises in the international monetary system, the
IMF reviews national, regional, and global economic and financial developments.
It provides advice to its 184 member countries, encouraging them to adopt
policies that foster economic stability, reduce their vulnerability to economic and
financial crises, and raise living standards, and serves as a forum where they can
discuss the national, regional, and global consequences of their policies.10
The IMF also makes financing temporarily available to member countries to
help them address balance of payments problems—that is, when they find

9

The SDR, or Special Drawing Right, is an international reserve asset that member countries (states) can
add to their foreign currency and gold reserves and use for payments requiring foreign exchange. Its value
is set daily using a basket of four major currencies: the Euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and US dollar.
The IMF introduced the SDR in 1969 because of concern that the stock and prospective growth of
international reserves might not be sufficient to support the expansion of world trade. The SDR was
introduced as a supplementary reserve asset, which the IMF could “allocate” periodically to members when
the need arose, and cancel, as necessary.
10
IMF’s purposes; http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm#do.
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themselves short of foreign exchange because their payments to other countries
exceed their foreign exchange earnings.11

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Bretton Woods conference in 1944 represented a response to the
international financial “anarchy” that had existed in the 1930’s as countries
pursued beggar-my-neighbor policies in the form of competitive devaluations and
protectionist commercial policy. Against a backdrop of global recession and
shrinking world trade there was a belief that an international monetary order could
be established that would facilitate global expansion and “full” employment
without having to revert to the rigidities imposed by the gold standard.12
IV. GREAT DEPRESSION
The Great Depression was an economic slump in North America, Europe, and
other industrialized areas of the world that began in 1929 and lasted until about
1939. It was the longest and most severe depression ever experienced by the
industrialized Western world. The Great Depression began in the United States
but quickly turned into a worldwide economic slump owing to the special and
intimate relationships that had been forged between the United States and
European economies after World War I. The United States had emerged from the
war as the major creditor and financier of postwar Europe, whose national
economies had been greatly weakened by the war itself, by war debts, and, in the
case of Germany and other defeated nations, by the need to pay war reparations.
So once the American economy slumped and the flow of American investment
credits to Europe dried up, prosperity tended to collapse there as well. The
Depression hit hardest those nations that were most deeply indebted to the United
11

Ibid.
Historical Background; http://books.google.com/books?id=dTw6oS_XXCUC&pg=RA1PA2&ots=1ctDDwGBCR&dq=historical+background+of+IMF&sig=MjnkR7RK83mqYvDrwGgas_NbN4#PRA1-PA2,M1.
12
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States, i.e., Germany and Great Britain. In Germany, unemployment rose sharply
beginning in late 1929 and by early 1932 it had reached 6 million workers, or 25
percent of the work force. Britain was less severely affected, but its industrial and
export sectors remained seriously depressed until World War II. Many other
countries had been affected by the slump by 1931.13
Almost all nations sought to protect their domestic production by imposing
tariffs, raising existing ones, and setting quotas on foreign imports. The effect of
these restrictive measures was to greatly reduce the volume of international trade:
by 1932 the total value of world trade had fallen by more than half as country
after country took measures against the importation of foreign goods.14
After the Great Depression, government action, whether in the form of
taxation, industrial regulation, public works, social insurance, social-welfare
services, or deficit spending, came to assume a principal role in ensuring
economic stability in most industrial nations with market economies.
V. BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
One thing was evident: the huge need for a new stabilized monetary system,
and there were plans made to monitor all actions by supervising institutions. In
1944 during the international conference, the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were “created”. They
agreed on implementing a system of fixed exchange rates with the US dollar as
the main currency.
The plans for the Bretton Woods System were developed by two very
important economists, the US financial secretary Harry Dexter White and the
British economist John Keynes who stated: “We the delegates of this conference
have been trying to accomplish something very difficult. It has been our task to
find a common measure, a common standard, a common rule acceptable for all”.
13
14

Great Depression; http://www.english.uiuc.edu/maps/depression/about.htm.
Ibid.
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This statement outlines the difficulty of creating a system that every nation could
accept.15
Within the context of Bretton Woods’s system, the IMF fulfilled four key
functions. First, it was an adjustment institution offering advice and some degree
of compulsion in terms of appropriate domestic macroeconomic policy. Second, it
was a financing institution providing short to medium term financial assistance in
support of approved policy, designed to eliminate balance of payments deficits.
Third, it helped to co-ordinate macroeconomic policy internationally by
encouraging countries to design policies in ways that supported pegged exchange
rates, in effect supervising a rule-based system of macroeconomic co-ordination.
Finally, it acted as a forum for the debate of international monetary reform.
Although never completely free from contemporary criticism, during the golden
age of the 1950’s and 1960’s criticisms of the Fund were muted. As known, the
Fund had been set up to run a system designed to encourage global economic
growth, full employment and expanding world trade and on all counts the world
economy seemed to be performing quite satisfactorily.
The end of the Bretton Woods System is a subject of debate. However, most
economists agree that the System broke down due to the excessive expansion of
the reserve currency upon which the System was based, the US dollar. The US
went from being a surplus nation after the Second World War to running an
enormous trade deficit primarily due to spending heavily on the Vietnam War and
the President Johnson’s great society initiatives. The closing of the “gold
window” on August 15, 1971 by President Nixon ended the convertibility of the
US dollar into gold and triggered the collapse of the Bretton Woods international
monetary regime. The crisis was caused by a persistent US balance of payments
deficit, which was the result of inflationary US fiscal and monetary policies.
Moreover, rather than increasing taxes to finance these expenses, the US resorted

15

Ralph H. Folsom, Michael W. Gordon, John A. Spanogle, International Trade and Economic Relations,
USA 2004.
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to an expansionary monetary policy, effectively printing more money to finance
the growing budget deficit.16

B. SOME SPECIFIC POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)
I. Exchange rate stability through fixed exchange rates

Seeking to restore order to international monetary relations, the IMF’s
founders charged the new institution with overseeing the international monetary
system to ensure exchange rate stability and encouraging member countries to
eliminate exchange restrictions that hindered trade. Under the Bretton Woods
system, exchange rates were supposed to be “fixed but adjustable” with
adjustment limited to cases of fundamental disequilibrium. Countries could, with
the Fund’s agreement, adjust their par values to reflect their changing economic
circumstances relative to other countries. The organizing idea was that the many
changes in exchange rates in the inter-war period had produced instability,
introduced extra risk to international trade, encouraged manipulation and
generally contributed to the depression and war that were on the minds of all
those who planned the post-war world17. The aim was to prevent unilateral
adjustments of the kind seen in the 1930’s and over the years, many exchange rate
values were altered. Although increasing strains in the system became evident
during the 1960’s, the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, combined with trade
liberalization, and had enabled the industrial countries in particular to grow
rapidly in the postwar period. But the Bretton Woods system hinged on the
continued willingness of the US authorities to maintain the so-called gold
window- the right of anyone to convert their dollars into gold at the fixed rate of
35$ per ounce. For much of the postwar period, large US capital account deficits

16

Bretton Woods System; http://html.rincondelvago.com/bretton-woods_1.html
http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system
http://www.answers.com/topic/bretton-woods-system .
17

Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2003, p.524.
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had been offset by current account surpluses. As the US economy came under
pressure from the struggle to finance rapid rises in domestic spending programs
and the cost of the war in Vietnam, the US government decided it could no longer
underpin the international financial system. In august 1971, President Nixon
announced that the gold window would be closed and by 1973 the system of fixed
exchange rates had been abandoned.
II. Breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system
This breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system ended each country’s
obligation to maintain a fixed price for its currency against gold and other
currencies.18
For the first three decades after World War II, under the Breton Woods
arrangements, the US dollar was the main currency, where most of transactions in
international trade and finance were carried out in dollars and even payments
were made in US dollars. Based on this, the world was on a dollar standard. But
on the other side, recovery contained the seeds of its own destruction. US trade
deficits were fueled by an overvalued currency, budget deficits to finance the
Vietnam War, and growing overseas investment by American firms.19
By 1971, the stock of liquid dollar balances had become so large that
governments had difficulty defending the official parities and the lower barriers to
financial flows meant that billions of dollars could cross the Atlantic in minutes
and threaten to overwhelm existing parities.20
These are some of the main reasons why this system was demised, while as the
United States abandoned the Bretton Woods system, the world moved into the
modern financial system. Financial systems within developed economies are
essentially similar in their structure and operation. Generically, institutions,

18

Breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system; http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-247600/money.
Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, ECONOMICS, Seventeenth Edition 2001, page 628.
20
Ibid.
19
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markets and instruments are fundamentally alike, but may often be differentiated
by size, terminology, and the level of government regulation and prudential
supervision. While each nation-state is responsible for the structure and operation
of its own financial system, today, each financial system is a part of the global
financial system. Internationalization of financial markets, supported by the
adoption of sophisticated technology-based information and product delivery
systems, has resulted in the development of new products and markets, and an
enormous increase in the volume and speed of the flow of funds through the
international money and capital markets.21
III. Macroeconomic and financial policies
1. IMF Borrowing
Technically, countries do not receive loans from the IMF- they “purchase”
foreign exchange from the IMF’s reserve assets, paying with their own currency.
The loan is considered repaid when the borrower “repurchases” its currency from
the IMF in exchange for reserve assets. While talking about borrowing, it’s worth
of mentioning stand-by-arrangements and conditionality.
Stand-by-arrangements form the core of the IMF’s lending policies. It provides
assurance to a member country that it can draw up to a specified amount, usually
over 12-18 months, to deal with a short-term balance of payments problem.
When a country borrows from the IMF, its government makes commitments
on economic and financial policies- a requirement known as conditionality.
Conditionality is a way for the IMF to monitor that its loan is being used
effectively in resolving the borrower’s economic difficulties, so that the country
will be able to repay promptly, and make the funds available to other members in
need. In recent years, the IMF has worked to focus and streamline conditionality,
in order to promote national ownership of strong and effective policies.

21

Modern financial system; http://www.designpoint.com.au/pdf/books/fininst-text.pdf.
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2. Surveillance
The IMF is responsible for overseeing the international monetary system and
for monitoring the economic and financial policies of its 185 member countries.
This process is known as surveillance. It involves tracking economic
developments, both globally and in individual countries, and letting policymakers
know if adjustments are warranted.
In its oversight of member states, the IMF focuses on the following:
•

Macroeconomic policies relating to the government’s budget, the

management of money and credit, and the exchange rate;
•

Macroeconomic performance- government and consumer spending,

business investment, exports and imports, output (GDP), employment and
inflation
•

Balance of payments- that is, the balance of a country’s transactions with

the rest of the world
•

Financial sector policies, including the regulation and supervision of banks

and other financial institutions, and
•

Structural policies that affect macroeconomic performance, such as those

governing labor markets, the energy sector and trade.
The IMF advises members on how they might improve their policies in these
areas so as to achieve higher rates of employment, lower inflation, and sustainable
economic growth.22

22

Macroeconomic and financial policies; http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm#box5.
August 2007, Prishtina

15

University for Business and Technology
Faculty of:
Business, Management and Economics

C. THE IMF’S ROLE TODAY
I. IMF and assistance to developing countries
As its systematic role evaporated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, so the International Monetary system (IMF) became drawn into a much
more specific role in the context of the balance of payments (BOP) problems that
developing countries were encountering. At its inception, the IMF had been seen
as having no specific role in developing countries, but now it became exclusively
these countries that formed its clientele. While during the 1970s, the IMF had
continued to make a few relatively large loans to a limited member of industrial
countries (e.g. Italy and the United Kingdom), beyond the mid-1970s industrial
countries ceased to draw any resources from it.
In the early 1990’s, the emergence of the Central and East European
economies (countries in transition) presented the IMF with a new challenge as
well as a new opportunity, but developing countries continued to dominate the
pattern of its lending. The IMF has extended substantial amounts of credit to
member countries and has allocated special drawing rights to them. Developing
countries have especially benefited from the IMF’s basic financing and from
certain facilities designed mainly for them. More specifically, except promoting
exchange stability and assist in eliminating foreign exchange restrictions, IMF is
expected to make its resources temporarily available to members under adequate
safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity.
Consultations with members have become a major function, and the IMF has
been enjoined to exercise surveillance over exchange rate policies of members
and international liquidity. After early disagreements, IMF lending policies have
been worked out and adapted over the years. Initially, financial assistance was
provided in only one way; charges were uniform for members but were graduated

August 2007, Prishtina
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according to complex schedules. In time, special needs of groups of members,
particularly developing countries, were recognized by the establishment of several
special policies or facilities for the use of the Fund’s financial resources. Larger
drawings in relation to quotas were permitted. Charges were simplified and, to a
limited extent, subsidized for low-income countries. All these developments were
approved by the executive board and, in some cases, by votes of the governors
and member governments, but they were disturbing to some, while others thought
they did not go far enough. The subject of additional economic assistance to the
developing countries is timely because of the adverse impact on them of the
recent world-wide recession, the prospect that some of the poorest countries will
not participate fully in the recovery, the unfavorable terms of trade of the non-oil
developing countries, the persistent external debt problem, and the expectations
that per capita income will continue to stagnate or decline in some countries.
External assistance can encourage and complement policies that will help
developing countries strengthen their balance of payments and domestic
economies, resulting in beneficial effects on world trade and finance23.
The provision of additional economic assistance through the IMF would be an
extension of past practices rather than a new departure. All users of the Fund’s
financial resources have been assisted. Developing countries have received
especially significant amounts of economic assistance because they have drawn
on the Fund’s basic financing and special facilitates to a much greater extent than
have the industrial countries. In addition, part of the Fund’s gold has been used
for the benefit of the developing countries.

23

Book, Economic Assistance to Developing Countries through the IMF, Richard Goode, Washington DC,
Publisher:: The Brookings Institution.
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II. Resolution of financial crisis
In the early 1980s, Mexico, then Brazil and then a number of other states,
principally in Latin America, became unable to pay their external debts, and even
interest in their debts, as the came due. Even the Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union states, as they turned away from communism, found themselves
without the resources needed to join the international economy and the
international monetary system that had grown up largely without their
participation.
The details of the origin of the crisis of developing country debt are beyond the
scope of this volume, and indeed vary from state to state. However, in 1970s,
following the first sharp rise in oil prices, many developing countries, particularly
in Latin America, undertook massive borrowing from commercial banks in the
US, Western Europe and Japan. The banks, which were bidding, through high
rates, for deposits from the newly super rich oil-producing states and sheikdoms
of the Middle East, were more than willing to re-lend the funds thus acquired to
developing countries as long as the interest was high enough24.
On the other side, the developing countries, uncomfortable with conditionality
administered by IMF and to some extent by the World Bank, found that
commercial banks had neither the will nor the political legitimacy to enforce
conditions on sovereign decision-making by the borrowers.
In some crisis, coordinated debt restructuring by private creditors may be
needed. To facilitate debt restructuring the IMF has promoted the inclusion of
Collective Action Clauses in international bond issues. The use of these clauses,
which is the norm under U.K law and has become the market standard for bonds
issued under New York law, and which is designed to prevent a small minority of
creditors from blocking a restructuring deal to which the majority of creditors
agree. The IMF also supports the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and fair debt

24

Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, Oxford 2003, p. 567.
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restructuring drafted by the Institute for International Finance in 2004, and the
Paris Club’s Evian Approach to debt relief for countries that have unsustainable
debt but that do not qualify for assistance under the HIPC Initiative.25
III. Technical assistance
Technical assistance means that IMF supports the development of the
productive resources of member countries by helping them to effectively manage
their economic policy and financial affairs. The IMF helps these countries to
strengthen their capacity in both human and institutional resources, and to design
appropriate macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies. It is normally
provided free of charge to any requesting member country, within IMF resource
constraints. About 90% of IMF technical assistance goes to low and lower-middle
income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Post conflict
countries are also major beneficiaries. Apart from the immediate benefit to
recipient countries, by helping individual countries reduce weaknesses and
vulnerabilities, technical assistance also contributes to a more robust and stable
global economy.
The IMF provides technical assistance mainly in its areas of core expertise:
macroeconomic policy, tax policy and revenue administration, expenditure
management, monetary policy, exchange rate system, financial sector
sustainability. Since demand for technical assistance consistently exceeds supply,
priority is given to providing assistance that complements and enhances the IMF’s
other key areas of operations, surveillance and lending. Efforts in recent years to
strengthen the international financial system have triggered additional demands
for IMF technical assistance.
At the same time, there is a continuing demand for technical assistance to help
low-income countries build capacity to design and implement poverty reducing
and growth programs, and to help heavily indebted poor countries undertake debt
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sustainability analyses and manage debt reduction programs. The IMF also
contributes actively to the integrated framework for trade-related technical
assistance, which aims to assist the low income countries expand their
participation in the global economy.26
The IMF provides technical assistance while the recipient country is fully
involved in the entire process, from identification of need, to implementation,
monitoring and evaluation. Depending on the nature of assignment, support is
often provided through staff missions of limited duration sent from headquarters.
Assistance might also be provided in the form of technical and diagnostic studies,
training courses, seminars, workshops, and online advice and support. The IMF
has increasingly adopted a regional approach to the delivery of technical
assistance and training. It operates six regional technical assistance centers: in the
Pacific, the Caribbean, East, West and Central Africa and the Middle East. IMF
technical assistance is financed from both internal and external sources. The IMF
finances directly technical assistance delivery, supervision, administrative and
other overhead costs, and these accounts for about one-fourth of its total net
administrative budget. The IMF also administers funding provided by bilateral
and multilateral donors. Such cooperation and resource sharing has two benefits:
it leverages the resources available for technical assistance, and it helps avoid
duplication of advice by different donors.27

IV. Financial assistance
Financial assistance is available to give member countries the breathing room
they need to correct balance of payments problems. A policy program supported
by IMF financing is designed by the national authorities in close cooperation with
the IMF, and continued financial support is conditional on effective
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implementation of this program. The International Monetary Fund offers
assistance in several areas, including: fiscal policy, monetary and exchange rate
policies, banking and financial system supervision and regulation. As an example,
the collapse of the Soviet Union the Fund stepped in to help the Baltic States,
Russia, and other former soviet countries by setting up treasury systems for their
central banks as part of the transition from centrally planned to market-based
economic systems.28
The financial assistance is provided through different types of lending policies:
stand-by arrangements and medium term extended arrangements. While medium
term arrangements are intended for countries with balance of payments
difficulties related to structural problems which may take longer to correct than
macroeconomic weaknesses, stand-by arrangements are designed to deal mainly
with short term balance of payments. Typically when a member applies for a
stand-by, negotiations are initiated between the staff of the Fund and financial
officials of the member state. The process is dispatched from Fund headquarters,
to gather information and discuss the steps that the Fund is going to take by
making the line of credit available to the state for six months, a year or under so
called Extended Arrangements, which means longer periods. The final step or
end- product is a Letter of Intent to the Managing Director of the Fund signed by
the Minister of Finance or Governor of the Central Bank of the applicant state, in
consideration of which the Executive Board approves the stand-by29.
The IMF also provides loan to help its poorest member countries achieve external
viability, sustainable economic growth and improved living standards. The
International Monetary Fund also provides the type of loans that help its member
states succeed with balance of payments problems caused by different events such
as natural disasters, the aftermath of military conflicts and temporary shortfalls in
export earnings. However, like the World Bank, the IMF makes loans also
conditional on the borrowing country adopting sound policies that promise to
28
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correct its balance of payments problem. Although such conditions have come
under criticism from certain quarters, they are supposed to help ensure that by
borrowing from the IMF, a country does not just postpone hard choices and
accumulate more debt, but is able to strengthen its economy and repay the loan. In
the face of mounting criticism of its intrusive conditionality policy the Fund
sought to streamline its conditionality in 2000-2001 by making it more sharply
focused on macroeconomic and financial sector policies and less intrusive into
countries’ policy choices. Unlike the lending by other development agencies such
as the World Bank, IMF lending is temporary, ranging from about 3-10 years.
V. Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was established by the IMF in
September 1999, in order to make the objectives of poverty reduction and facility
growth more central to lending operations in its poorest member countries. Based
on some of the IMF’s staff reviews in 2002 and by the Independent Evaluation
Office of the IMF in 2004 the designs of the programs supported by Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) lending has become more accommodating
to higher public expenditure, in particular pro-poor spending.30
Another review of PRGF program design by the Executive Board in September
2005 found that while macroeconomic outcomes in low-income countries had
improved markedly in recent years, per capita income remains low. This review is
focused in the importance of broad economic institutions for sustained growth and
stability, and the need to manage carefully increased aid flows.31
These supported programs are framed around country owned Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers, which are prepared by government with the active
participation of civil society and other development partners and which then
considered by the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank as the basis for
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concession lending from each institution and debt relief under the joint Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.32
VI. Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
With the aim of ensuring that no poor country faces a debt burden that can not
manage, in 1996 the IMF launched the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Countries.
In order to reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of the most
heavily indebted poor countries, the Initiative entails coordinated action by the
international financial community, including multilateral organizations and
governments.33
Based on the Review of 1999, a number of modifications were approved to
provide faster, deeper and broader debt relief and to strengthen the links between
debt relief, poverty reduction and social policies. However, even supplemented by
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative is not a panacea (disapproving something that will solve all
problems).Even if all of the external debts of these countries were forgiven, most
would still depend on significant levels of concession external assistance, since
their receipts of such assistance have been much larger than their debt-service
payments for many years.34
VII. Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative provides for hundred percent reliefs on
eligible debt from three multilateral institutions to a group of low income
countries. In June 2005, the group of eight major industrial countries (G8)
proposed that the three multilateral institutions: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and
the African Development Fund (AfDF) – cancel hundred percent of their debt
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claims on countries that have reached the completion point under the joint IMFWorld Bank enhanced HIPC Initiative.35
In comparison with HIPC, the MDRI goes further by providing full debt relief
so as to free up additional resources to help these countries reach the MDGs. It’s
worth of mentioning that in deciding to implement the MDRI, the IMF Executive
Board modified the original G-8 proposal to fit the requirement, specific to the
IMF, that the use of the IMF’s resources be consistent with the principle of
uniformity of treatment.36
The IMF and the World Bank are cooperating closely in the implementation and
monitoring of the MDRI. The first progress report on the IMF’s implementation of the
MDRI was presented to the IMF Board in April 2006.

D. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF KOSOVA’S DEVELOPMENT SINCE
1999
Kosova’s population is roughly 2.4 million, with a working population of 1.1 million and
an area of about 11 thousand square kilometers. Following the end of the war of March–
June 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR1244) of
June 10, 1999, placed Kosova under temporary UN administration, while reaffirming the
sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over the territory.
According to a new constitutional framework, adopted on May 15, 2001 responsibility
for administering the territory is now shared between the UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosova (UNMIK), and Kosova’s self-government, the Provisional Institutions
of Self Government (PISG), which took office in April 2002. 37
Kosova has entered a decisive face in its current development. The maintenance of
stability, both economical and political, will be of central importance in supporting the
forthcoming discussions on the final status of Kosova, which is yet to be determined. The
UN Security Council has indicated its support for a set of standards, whose achievement
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paved the way toward discussions on the future of Kosova’s final status, and as well as
on its future development. 38
At the request of UNMIK, and later the PISG, and together with the rest of the
international community, the IMF has been assisting institution building and the
formulation and implementation of economic policy in Kosova. With its assistance
Kosova have nevertheless, developed a realistic medium-term macroeconomic
framework based upon prudent fiscal policy. This work has been closely coordinated
with the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral donors. Apart from technical
assistance provided by the Fund’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Monetary and Financial
Systems Department, and Statistics Department, the European Department has provided
macroeconomic policy advice on an ongoing basis.39
I hope that the analysis of the Letter of Intent, comparisons and the analyses of IMF
recommendations from 2002 till 2006 - 2007 will contribute to informing the debate
about economic policies, in particular, and about the broader issues that will shape
Kosova’s future.

E. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMF’S ESTIMATION OF KOSOVA’S
ECONOMY
While Kosova has a unique history which reflects its current uncertain status, it is one of
the last countries to start the road of transition to a market economy with labor market
and unemployment problems.40
Assuming a population growth of 2 percent per annum for Albanian and 1.2 percent for
other ethnic groups living in Kosova, the IMF estimates population in Kosova of 2.4
million.

Table 1 Macroeconomic indicators
GDP in mil € 1
GDP growth (annual), % 1
CPI 1
GDP per capita, in € 1
Gov. revenues (% of GDP)
Bank deposits, mil.€ 2

2002
1,735
1.2
3.6
913
28.8
413

2003
1,797
3.1
1.0
930
32.8
501

2004
1,895
3.2
1.5
964
31.9
677 (Nov)

2005 *
1,999
1.7
2.0
1,000
30.8
-

38
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Registered job-seekers

257,505 (Dec) 280,923 (Nov)

298,036 (Jul)

-

The IMF estimates that 750,000 - 800,000 people are currently working in services
(55%), manufacturing (20%), and agro-food (15%). Therefore the unemployment rate of
Kosova is 45-50%.41
Total production (GDP) in Kosova is € 2.5 billion. GDP is measured by combining total
consumption and investment (€ 2.5 billion = € 1.9 billion + € 0.5 billion). The GDP per
capita is approximately € 1040 and is measured by dividing total GDP of €2.5 billion by
total population of 2.4 million people.42
The total income is € 850 million; Income = GDP - consumption + investment +
government deficit + trade balance (exports – imports).
In 1999, of €1, 40% was subsidized, 30% from abroad, 30% taxed
In 2006, of € 1, 10% is from grants from the international community, 15% from abroad,
75% taxed (25% from GDP and 50% from the products sector).43
The private investment of € 500 million is financed primarily by banks. Currently there
is € 900 million in deposits available for lending in the banks. 72% is currently being
lent, whereas the maximum that may be lent is 75%.
25% of GDP, €630 million, is collected in taxes: customs and VAT. This has been a
stable source of income for Kosova as the customs officials have been quite diligent on
collecting the taxes at the border.44
Total spending in Kosova is € 700 million: € 140 million for public investment; € 210
million for subsidies; € 200 million for civil service; € 150 million for general expenses,
such as cars, gas, etc. € 30,000 million is spent on education and only € 18,000 on
teachers. There is a need to reform the educational sector; however the government is
hesitant to do so because of their fear of unions. However, it is recommended that
Kosova should strengthen their human infrastructure through allocating more money to
the education sector. It is advised that there may be a role for UNICEF to advocate for
more effective spending on education.45

Marc Auboin (20 June 2006), IMF’s Resident Representative to Kosova briefed the office on Kosova’s
economic situation.
42
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There are 77,000 people working in the public sector; 30 c of €1 pays their wages.
64,000 people were hired by UNMIK before the transfer. Starting next year there will be
public service reform where 10% of the workers will be reduced, however there will not
be a reduction in the police, tax and education sectors.
Fiscal sustainability is when the right resources are in the right place, which leads to
competitiveness. Kosova is not really competitive because there are high salaries
compared to other regions.
Kosova has a debt of €550 million owed to the World Bank for projects related to
infrastructure prior to 1999. The World Bank is not negotiable on the debt and insists
that Kosova pay the annual interest of € 50 million every year. Marc insists that it is
essential that Kosova does not default on the loan; therefore the government must factor
in the debt in its total budget.46
The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is the projected amount the
government may spend. The total spending is €700 million- €50 million owed to the
World Bank which allows for € 650 million expenditure.
There will be an estimated 2% growth per year. Unfortunately with the amount of young
people coming onto the labor market, Kosova needs 5% growth to be sustainable.
Additionally, there is a prevailing issue of employment availability abroad as the migrant
workers from the new EU member states will have priority in the EU labor market.
Migrant workers from Kosova will have fewer employment opportunities.47
It’s worth of mentioning the fact that the labor market in Kosova has some distinctive
characteristics compared to other countries, because its young population annual net
inflows in the labor force is 5%-6% of current employment, which means that
employment has to grow by more than 6% per year for unemployment to fall. On the
other hand, there is a large scale of emigration (both temporary and permanent
emigration).
The effects of emigration on the labor market are of particular interest given its scale and
the level of remittances. This is because it is mainly young and other working age
individuals that emigrate, which affects the labor force and therefore the unemployment
rate in Kosova. When estimating the remittances, there are different estimations. Data
from Statistical Office of Kosova estimates that the average monthly income per
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household from remittances is 48.9 €. The International Monetary Fund (2004) argues
that this is an underestimation of remittances because of the following reasons:
Households do not want to draw attention to their total income, and
Do not report remittances from the family members working abroad illegally
The IMF estimates annual remittances of 241 Mio €, which is 13.4 percent of the GDP
estimated in 2003.
It would be of great interest to explore the impact of the informal employment and in
general of the informal economy. It is true that informal economy creates unfair
competition and therefore damages other private businesses that pay taxes. Now, such a
research would identify causes that businesses keep unregistered employed people or in
the extreme case they stay informal altogether.
This research would help the government to address these problems as it is beneficial for
all parties: increase taxes, improve competition etc. However, due to a lack of a proper
social security, informal economy provides the only source of income for many
households.

F. FIRST IMF’S MISSIONS IN KOSOVA
I. Kosova’s economic landscape has changed significantly during the last
three years.
Reconstruction of public and private buildings is now well advanced, agriculture is being
revitalized, there is a vibrant private service sector, and an emerging banking system is
transforming the cash-based economy. Although comprehensive and reliable statistics are
not available, real growth has almost certainly been in the double digits in 2000 and
2001. There are still, of course, major problems: unemployment remains very high, the
economy is heavily aid-dependent and still dominated by public and socially-owned
enterprises, poverty is widespread, the legal framework for a market economy is not yet
complete, gray activities are pervasive, and the quality of public infrastructure is low. But
despite these handicaps and distortions, Kosova’s economy today has a recognizable
face.48

II. The IMF has been active in Kosova since it came under temporary UN
administration.
The Fund has advised UNMIK and—more recently—the Kosovar self-government on
macroeconomic policies through frequent missions and ongoing dialogue, coordinating
48
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with donors through the Working Level Steering Group, as well as bilaterally. The Fund
has provided technical assistance to the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) in the areas of tax
policy, tax administration, and setting up the treasury; and to the Banking and Payments
Authority of Kosova (BPK) in introducing a payments system, modern prudential
standards and bank supervision, as well as in its internal reorganization. The Fund also
appoints the BPK’s Managing Director. The Fund has published two reports (Kosova:
Macroeconomic Issues and Fiscal Sustainability in 2001 and Kosova: Institutions and
Policies for Reconstruction and Growth in 2002), providing the only publicly available
source at that time of macroeconomic statistics and analysis for Kosova. Finally, in
September 2002 the Fund opened a Liaison Office in Pristina, with financial support by
Luxembourg.49

This is a good time for both Kosovars and donors to take stock of the
situation and medium-term prospects, and draw conclusions that would
guide policies in the coming years.50
The end of the post war situation means that the future of Kosova’s economy, political
and social development is in the hands of decision making institutions or policy makers
in Prishtina, such as UNMIK or the self-government. Their policy decisions today will
shape the future of Kosova’s economy. At the same time, since continuing uncertainty
about Kosova’s final status impedes access to foreign direct investment and financing,
Kosova still needs support in the form of donor grants in order to build a sustainable
economy.

III. The dearth of economic statistics makes it difficult to assess the state of
the economy
Preliminary estimates suggest that GDP in 2001 reached € 1.7 billion or about US$900950 per capita (Table 1). Consumption and investment together were more than twice as
high, owing to large official and private transfers. Imports were about 120 percent of
GDP and, given the extremely low level of exports, were financed almost entirely by
transfers from donors and Kosovars abroad. As a result of the latter, GNP exceeded GDP
by about 40 percent. There are indications that in 2002, the pace of economic growth has
slowed to 7 percent from two-digit figures in 2000-01, reflecting the easing of the postconflict reconstruction and a small decline in the presence of expatriates in Kosova.

49
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Consumer price inflation is also estimated to have slowed to about 6½ percent from over
10 percent in 2001.51

IV. The economy is heavily dependent on official transfers.
Between July 1999 and end-2001, a total of € 2.1 billion of grants were committed and €
1.6 billion disbursed, which annualized corresponds to about 45 percent of GDP over the
same period. As a first approximation, official transfers and the local spending of
expatriates together generate currently about one-fourth of total value added in the
economy. This not only creates distortions—mainly an expansion of the government at
the expense of the private sector and of services at the expense of traded goods—but also
makes the economy especially sensitive to cutbacks in donor support.52

G. AID AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN KOSOVA
Aid has had strong positive effects, both on the supply and on the demand side: it has
been instrumental in repairing the physical infrastructure, establishing the legal
framework and institutions for a market economy, generating demand for private service
activities, providing employment, and building skills. However, it has also created
distortions: in particular, it has distorted relative wages and raised the relative price of
non-traded goods—including labor—thus inhibiting the development of the traded goods
sector. 53
In the past three years, Kosova received substantial aid to address immediate
humanitarian and reconstruction needs, well above levels observed in most post-conflict
economies. If services provided directly by donors, such as the services of expatriate
advisers, security (provided by KFOR), police, etc. are added, the amount of aid is almost
equal to Kosova’s GDP in the early post-conflict years.54
Aid dependence—the concept commonly used in economic literature—is defined as the
ratio of aid (in all forms) to domestically available resources (C+I+G), and is estimated at
close to 30 percent in 2002. The share of aid to GDP consists of aid (in all its forms) plus
local spending of expatriates minus the import content of these expenditures. This
measure amounted to about one-fourth of Kosova’s GDP and one-third of total aid flows
in 2002. It should be stressed that the estimates of the value of services provided directly
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by donors, as well as the domestic spending by expatriates, are very tentative and subject
to a large margin of error.55
A substantial decline in aid will have a major negative impact on growth. Based on the
calculations above, a € 100 million decline in total aid would directly lower GDP by
about € 33 million. Over time, of course, the impact of a reduction in aid on GDP would
also depend on a host of other factors, such as the areas in which the cutbacks would take
place and their phasing. But most importantly, the impact on growth would depend on the
domestic supply response to the economic policies in place.56
The two major sources of growth in Kosova today are aid-related activities (primarily
government and other services) and other domestic activities (notably agriculture,
construction, light industry, and trade). By 2007, these activities will dominate the
economy, sustaining an annual growth rate of 5-6 percent, in line with the experience of
other post-conflict economies in the region. In the near term, however, the contribution of
domestic activities will not be sufficient to offset the impact of the decline in aid, as
official transfers are projected to fall from over 50 percent of GDP in 2002 to 23 percent
by 2004. This is expected to cause a slowdown in growth to 4-4½ percent in 2003-04
(Table 1). Performance in later years would depend crucially on the success of structural
reforms, namely setting up effective economic institutions, repairing the infrastructure,
and creating an environment conducive to productive private investment. As regards the
balance of payments, the tapering off of reconstruction activity and fall in aid flows will
depress imports. Growing exports and some pick up of remittances are expected to keep
the external current account in broad balance. Since Kosova is using the Euro, inflation is
projected to remain low. At an average of 3 percent per annum, however, it is expected to
exceed the Euro area level of inflation.
Share of the government in Kosova’s economy (in percent of GDP) 57
Table 2

2000

2001

2002
Est.

Kosova Consolidated Budget (KCB)
expenditures (incl. municipalities)

15.7

16.0

27.0

KCB + public investment program (PIP) 60.1

49.6

47.6

55

Ibid.
Ibid.
57
Ministry of Economy &Finance ; Macroeconomic Department, 13th floor of Government Building.
56

August 2007, Prishtina

31

University for Business and Technology
Faculty of:
Business, Management and Economics

KCB + PIP + government services
provided by donors

100.4

87.4

77.9

In this table measures, it is not included the public investment program (PIP), which
has so far been financed entirely by donor grants. Once this is added, the share of the
government reaches about 50 percent of GDP.
As already mentioned the depth and duration of the slowdown in growth in the near term
will depend on the donor grants. Secondly, the extent and sustainability of the rebound
over the medium term will depend on the success of macroeconomic and structural
policies, as well as on modalities of the resolution of Kosova’s final status.
On the basis of the assumptions about the target level of public investment outlined
above, donor grants for investment are projected to fall from just over € 400 million this
year to about € 200 million in 2005, and continue declining thereafter. This would lower
the share of total government spending to GDP (excluding services provided directly by
donors) from almost 50 percent this year to 31 percent by 2005 and below 30 percent
thereafter. Even for this declining path of grants to materialize, new donor commitments
will be required. In the absence of new commitments, public investment would fall short
of the targeted level that has been incorporated in this macroeconomic framework58.

The main medium-term challenge for the public finances is to manage a
reduction of the size of the government while ensuring the provision of an
adequate level of public services.
Public expenses that the government is handling can be justified and reasonably
understandable by the urgent reconstruction and institution-building needs. As these are
now declining, donor grants will naturally fall. (Preliminary estimates of grant
disbursements have been made by the World Bank on the basis of a target level of public
investment of 10-15 percent of GDP during 2003-05, declining to 6–10 percent
thereafter. The sum of domestic revenues and donor grants is the resource envelope likely
to be available to the Kosova authorities to finance government current and capital
spending). At the same time, although domestically-generated tax revenues will continue
to increase. This will require careful policy choices and effective prioritization of
expenditure needs in a medium-term context.59

IMF office in Prishtina, BPK Building, IMF’s recommendation of Staff Representatives
at the Donor Coordination Meeting for Kosova, November 5, 2002.
59
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It has been assumed that, at least for the period of the projections, the
Kosova budget will not undertake domestic or external borrowing.
Self government institutions, UNMIK as well as IMF agreed that borrowing is an
uncertain action. The IMF advises are not to borrow without mechanisms to ensure that
projects financed by debt are chosen transparently and have an adequate rate of return;
Secondly, the settlement of past debt issues; and finally, a strong domestic revenue base
that could cover future debt servicing needs. Moreover, having access to financing it
would be a critical issue for Kosova’s future long-term development.60

Domestic revenue collection will continue improving, but at a slower pace
then in 2000-02.
Revenues of the Kosova Consolidated Budget (KCB) are reaching 20½ percent of
GDP, as similarly happened during two previous years. Although the domestic tax is
likely to slightly rise above the 20½-21½ percent range, at least in the near term, because
the pace of economic growth is likely to slow as donors withdraw.
The Fund staff’s detailed domestic revenue estimates are based on the following
assumptions:
•
Estimates of domestic VAT collection were based on the growth of private
consumption, which is expected to decline in 2004-05 and then increase for the remainder
of the period. The VAT rate is assumed to remain at 15 percent for the period.
•
Estimates for excises were based on the growth in domestic consumption as well
as the demand for petroleum products are linked to growth in economic activity.
•
Estimates of individual and profit taxes were based on projected wage increases
and real GDP growth, respectively. Furthermore, the estimates incorporate the impact of
the planned extension of the current wage tax to all incomes in 2003.
•
Customs duties were based on dutiable import growth assumptions and a gradual
reduction of the average tariff rate during 2003-05, in line with the authorities’
current intentions.
If no access to borrowings, total expenditures of the KCB (which excludes the PIP)
would have to be approximately equal to domestic revenues during 2003-05. The level of
total KCB expenditures is thus projected at 21-22 percent of GDP during 2003-07,
compared with 15-16 percent in previous years. This should be sufficient to finance
current spending at the level of 17-18 percent of GDP and a small amount of capital
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spending. Given that the KCB is not at present burdened with any debt service payments
and the cost of the social safety net in Kosova is relatively low by international standards,
this current expenditure envelope is broadly in line with that in other comparable
economies, and should provide sufficient room for financing the provision of basic public
services. 61

Tax policy should remain oriented toward a simple and efficient system, and
tax collection should be enforced
UNMIK and the self-government should reconsider the current intention to lower import
tariff rates. At this stage, this could result in a potentially significant loss of revenue from
a well-established tax source. In later years, once domestic revenue collection improves,
tariff reduction could be compensated by a modest VAT rate increase. Investments in tax
administration and the training of tax inspectors take years to bear fruit and should
continue to remain a government priority.

The key to medium-term fiscal sustainability is current expenditure
discipline
Budget Spending jumped from € 220 million in 2000 to € 380 million in 2002, partly on
account of the energy sector emergency. Demands for large wage hikes, in particular, are
out of line with economic fundamentals: the total government wage bills in Kosova, as
well as the average government wages, are already at or above the level in comparable
economies.
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Figure1. International comparison of current expenditure & Central Government wage bill (In
percent of GDP)
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Figure2. Average Government Wages as a multiple of per capita GDP) & General Government
Spending on Wages and Salaries (in percent of consolidated general government spending)
Therefore, during the coming years, average public wage increases should be limited to
about the rate of inflation, and measures should be taken to reduce overstaffing in the
civil service, thus:
o
allowing greater wage differentiation within the same wage bill envelope;
o
pension increases should be kept strictly in line with the cost of the basic food
basket, as provided for in the legislation;
o
maintenance expenditures should be kept up, but savings in spending on goods &
services should be generated through better public expenditure management,
o
appropriate procurement procedures, and stronger internal audit;
o
subsidies to public enterprises should be rapidly reduced by accelerating their
restructuring and improving collection rates.62

62

Ministry of Finance and Economy, World Bank, and IMF staff calculations.
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I. Recommendations in private sector
Progressive steps forward have already been undertaken in this area since 1999.UNMIK
and the self-government should now accelerate the legislative agenda, putting particular
emphasis on the laws on bankruptcy, foreign trade, public procurement,
competition, and land use; ensure that laws are applied equally to all, including notably
the tax laws; establish a pledge registry and land cadastre; improve the functioning of the
judiciary; and address concerns about judges’ bias in dealing with disputes between
banks and their customers. These steps would not encourage only the private sector to get
better organized in its legal field, but also to turn the informal activities to a legal and
formal economy.63

II. Financial sector development requires enforceable property rights and
strong supervision.
Financial intermediaries have an important role to play in evaluating and pricing risk,
financing investment, and enforcing good accounting and management practices.
Kosova’s nascent financial sector (for instance banking sector) has already started
transforming the traditionally cash-based economy. But despite very rapid credit growth
in recent months, financial intermediation remains very shallow compared to other
economies in the region.64

III. Privatization of socially-owned enterprises is a key component of the
transition to a market economy
Over certain period of time privatization will generate considerable gains for the
economy as a whole by unlocking the potential of assets—especially real estate—that
many of these enterprises hold, eliminating a source of budgetary costs, leveling the
playing field for all enterprises, and sending a signal about the kind of economy Kosova
wants to build. It is now urgent to:
o
taxes;
o
o
o
o

impose hard budget constraints on these enterprises by enforcing payment of
finalize and promulgate the land use rights law as soon as possible;
approve the KTA regulations, including rules governing the claim registration
process;
prepare the tenders for the first and second wave of privatizations by year-end.65

IMF office in Prishtina, BPK Building, IMF’s recommendation of Staff Representatives
at the Donor Coordination Meeting for Kosova, November 5, 2002.
64
Ibid.
65
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H. COMMITMENTS OF THE KOSOVA’S GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSED IN THE LETTER OF INTENT FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY66
I. Economic policy strategy expressed in LOI
Our modern and efficient tax system, with low uniform rates and few exemptions, in
combination with the liberal trade and tariff regime has allowed us to raise the revenues
required to operate government with a minimum of distortions. Since 1999, an
increasingly self-sustained private sector led economic development, which has been
instrumental in overcoming the drag on economic activity associated with a shrinking
donor sector. As a result, GNP per capita has grown by an average 13/4 per year since
2001.

Still more need to be done. Importantly, Kosova’s competitiveness must be improved
further. In the first instance, this requires reduction in the economy’s costs, including by
allowing wages, which are in some sectors still distorted by the large premia paid by
donors, to adjust the line with underling productivity. It will be essential to raise
productivity through competition and investment in the private sector, wich will be
supported by Governments ongoing priority efforts to improve physical infrastructure
through public investment and to raise human capital through better health services and
education.67

II. Fiscal Policy
Our fiscal policy management has greatly improved in line with changing challenges.
Our capacity to spend was lagging behind the growth of revenue, the year 2004 marked a
sharp turnaround and the Kosova Consolidated Budget swung into a large deficit of 138
million € (some 5 and a half percent of GDP). The new Government quickly
implemented corrective measures to cut the deficit to 95 million € in the current year (3.9
percent of GDP).
In the first place, ongoing deflation will curtail the growth of revenues. Thus in order to
continuo the consolidation process, both the growth and structure of public expenditure
must be tightly controlled. Controlled and management of the budget is a central factor in
the need to lower costs and hence foster private sector job creation.
66
67

Letter of Intent to the internal donor community (2 November 2005).
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The budget is in line with these requirements. We target a deficit not to exceed 77 million
€, which will arrest the growth of the share of public expenditure in GDP. At the same
time, the Government will implement the required transfer of powers to the PISG.
We have also abrogated those parts of the collective labor agreement, which necessitated
additional outlays for civil servants (including meal allowances and a thirteenth wage).
These measures will save some 56 million € form the wage bill.
To avoid undue stress on the Kosova Civil Service and to encourage professional growth,
vacancies will be offered in the first instance to qualify individuals in the current
workforce.
We are committed not to introduce any new benefits, including those, the implementation
of which has been postponed. Finally, we will abrogate the section in the collective labor
agreement requiring the budget to copay maternity leave benefits pay in the private sector
including the POEs.
We will not proceed with rehabilitation of Kosova A power plant through public funds
and have postponed plans to set up an independent transmission systems operator in the
electricity sector. This will save costs, but also not prejudge ongoing work in energy
sector reform. In order to ensure that budget organizations implement their generally
tighter allocations, we are also implementing a commitments monitoring system.

III. Macroeconomic Objectives
A wide gap between labor costs and productivity is present in comparison with countries
in the region and elsewhere, and these needs to be narrowed to generate more
employment. This process has started already as witnessed by observed sustained
deflation since June 2004. In shorter term, ongoing donor withdrawal, as well as the
sharp deterioration in Kosova’s terms of trade associated with the recent sharp raise in
commodity prices, is working in the opposite direction. We estimate that the increase in
oil prices alone is lowering GDP growth by some 11/2 percent in 2005.

IV. Medium-Term policy Framework
We will have to manage the further disengagement of donors, which may require
additional obligations for the budget. Indeed, there is some scope for saving as well
particularly with respect to public sector wage bill and the potential to redeploy our
sizable civil servants. With regard to the latter, we also intend to initiate public service

August 2007, Prishtina

39

University for Business and Technology
Faculty of:
Business, Management and Economics

reform program during 2006, with the aim of reducing our civil service mainly through
attrition, by some 10 percent in 2008.
Accordingly and in line with medium term macroeconomic framework, we plan to keep
the growth of real spending to below ½ percent. We expect that this transparent approach
will also help us in securing multi year pledges of budget support for international
donors. In addition, we will continue our work to improve the effectiveness of public
investment program (PIP). This requires us o improve information on donor coordination
statistics with a view toward eventual full integration of the PIP into the budget.

V. Socially and Publicly Owned Enterprises
KTA is seeking to privatize 90 percent of its value by mid 2006. The liquidation process
has also started for nine pilot enterprises as a result of spin-off privatization. We will
continue to improve governance of POE. The PTK and Prishtina Airport were
incorporated in June 2005, and the incorporation of the POE’s is under way.
Turning to KEK, we intend to raise our payment ratio from 37 percent in October 2005 to
45 percent by the end of 2006 in line with KEK’s financial recovery plan for 2004-2010.
These targets will be reached notably through a. the improvement of meter reading in
billing, b. effective disconnection, and c. reduction of illegal consumption. A joined task
force will be established to facilitate coordination of the institutional support to KEK’s
implementing its financial recovery plan. The task force will be composed of UNMIK
and PISG senior officials and will also be associated by the Head of Police and Justice.

VI. Financial sector
Over the last months bank landing has rapidly grown, and competition has held in
extending the majority available loans. In order to secure this welcome success, we are
keen to strengthen our regulatory and supervisory abilities in line with this rapid growth.
Expected changes in this macroeconomic environment such as deflation and donors’
withdrawal will also be incorporated in the analyses.
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VII. Labor Market
A flexible labor market is of primary importance in creating urgently needed
employment. We regret initiatives undertaken by the previous government in the context
of the three partite agreements (Government, Kosova Chamber of Commerce,
Syndicates) that are now limiting the required flexibility.
We will allow for a new employment contract that is not subject to minimum wages (but
to taxation). For the future, we will not interfere in the workings of the bargaining
process between employers and workers.

VIII. Technical assistance and statistics
Technical assistance from donors will continue to be essential in several areas. The
recently finalized national accounts statistics will need to be carried forward and local
compilation capacity strengthened, while financial statistics will need to become more
comprehensive. There are also needs in further capacity building in the fiscal area
including tax administration and expenditure management.

I. IMF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KOSOVA IN
MAY 2006
Facing strong headwinds, the economy has nevertheless recorded
considerable progress.68
Since 2003, GDP has grown by some 1⅔ percent on average, and is projected at three
percent for 2006. This rapid expansion is thought to be as a result of an active
performance of the private sector. However, there is a gap between productivity and
wages causing Kosova’s huge trade deficit of 40 percent of its GDP. This gap should be
lowered through labor intensive growth in outward oriented production—in both importcompeting and exporting sectors.

I. Economic adjustment will be a challenge for all.69
In 2003, prices have declined by some 5 percent, providing a better position for the
private sector. In this environment, corporate profits and margins have been squeezed;
this is a welcome sign, and must not be an argument for extending protection. Similarly,
68
69

AIDE MEMOIRE of the IMF Staff Mission in Kosova, May 22 - 31, 2006.
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pressures for lower wages, reinforced by falling donors, must not be counteracted by
policies that then impede the creation of the demand for new jobs opportunities.

II. Status presents opportunities but also new demands on policy makers.70
Beside the fact that the resolution of status will lead to a clearance of the property rights,
improve the domestic investment climate, facilitate access to international capital flows
improving dramatically the prospects for growth, on the other hand it basically will:
o
Place heavy demands on the budget due to the fact that remaining UNMIK
functions will be transferred,
o
Call for additional budget outlays on capital, education, and health,
o
Draw the attention to the fact that donor flows tend to be rapidly scaled back,
o
Call for servicing external debt (the amount of which is currently being
determined in talks with the Serbian authorities).

III. Recent decisions raise concerns as to whether policies are up to the
task.71
In late 2005 authorities adopted a Letter of Intent that sets out a comprehensive policy
package to support economic development. It rests on prudent fiscal policy, structural
reforms, and a social safety net targeted. However, there is a significant deviation of the
policies set out in the Letter of Intent, concerning the fact that no progress was made in
preparing the civil service reform, while social transfer schemes (which already cover 10
percent of the population and absorb almost one fifth of revenues) are set to continue
growing. Apart from the risks to the budget, these trends impede private sector growth in
two ways:
o
The gap between productivity and wage bill and ill targeted due to generous
transfers may increase
o
Financing the above mentioned policies stated in the Letter of Intent will require
higher taxes in the future, which will only add new costs to businesses.

IV. A deeper public debate on economic policy choices and constraints may
help secure stronger support for sound policies.72
A unique economic situation has brought Kosova to a complex issue which is not faced
elsewhere. The combination of use of the Euro currency, which has drastically scaled
back the donor support, and tremendous unemployment have brought a lid on income and
70

Ibid.
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wage growth for years to come. On the other hand, the economy has in the past benefited
from a strong private sector that has proven itself able to adapt quickly and find niches.
This should help those who call for less public employment and less extension of social
transfers. At the same time, wide-spread poverty is undeniable, and a well-informed
public debate may be beneficial in realigning social transfers to the most needy, and,
more generally, in prioritizing public spending.

J. CURRENT SITUATION
I. Fields in which Kosova has made progress
Concerning macroeconomic and structural policies, a recognizable progress has been
made. The economy is regionally participating, with a growth of 3 percent of GDP, and
with a stable price level.
The system, based on a wide base with low and uniform rates, is kept unchanged, except
for obligations under international agreements. In particular, no new exemptions from
taxes or import duties—formal or informal—are granted, no new differential rates
introduced, or existing differential rates extended. The recently adopted strategic reform
is in compliance with IMF recommendations.
Noticeable progress is made also in fiscal management, for instance, revenue collection
by 13 percent to €713 million was possible due to a special dividend scheme on the
telecommunication monopoly. Secondly, in spring of 2006, banking system has renewed
its investor interest, mobile-phone license was successfully re-tendered for the second
time, and finally, the work on comprehensive civil reform strategy is initiated, and a rapid
expansion of the private sector is faced.
Indeed, since 2003 prices have declined by some 5 percent, a key factor underpinning
private sector growth, in such environments, corporate profits and margins are squeezed;
this is a welcome sign.
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II. Fields in which Kosova need improvements
Kosova needs a reduction in costs of production in order to ensure a successfully
competition in domestic and international markets. Even though, in LOI it is stated the
aim to improve physical and human capital through public investment, this is yet an
immediate need.
The statistical base continues to lag considerably behind the developments in, and
requirements of, the economy while several donors have offered assistance, the limited
staying power of such assistance in the past suggests that better donor coordination is
necessary. It is also essential to safeguard the banking sector through proper supervision
and vigilance in addressing any evolving problems, in addition to working toward raising
competition through market forces. Past experience has also shown that the framework
dealing with loan recovery needs to be beefed up.
In regard to social transfer spending there are some remaining difficulties especially the
miners’ early retirement benefit continues to be paid at higher levels than provided for in
the relevant regulation, while a new benefit to compensate war martyrs has cost
implications that cannot be borne in the budget. Better targeted benefits are essential to
redress severe poverty within scarce budgetary means, while also limiting the negative
incentive effects for employment creation. Past spot audits have documented weak
benefit administration, as many ineligible claimants receive benefits. The joint task force
was not effective, as poor billing and collections continue and remain at the core of
KEK’s failure to improve electricity supply, and no longer require KEK to grant
forgiveness of electricity bills to “social cases”. KEK needs to complement budget
support by much improved billing and collections.
Importantly enough is the fact that we have yet recommendations to limit government
employment to what is strictly needed to provide functions, thus effectively achieve its
target to cut the civil service by 10 percent by 2008, and support plans to rationalize
expenditure on goods and services. Limiting the civil service wage bill and improving the
targeting of social benefits will strengthen incentives for private sector employment
creation. However, legislative proposals for the pension system, early retirement benefits,
and wage-tax funded unemployment and health insurance run counter these requirements
and are likely to result in even higher unemployment. The fact that there are expenditures
from a large underspending on public investment of €52 million, this is already putting an
urgent need for a new investment into lignite mines into question.
Expeditious privatization of utilities after status should be targeted as a priority matter,
including by designing appropriate corporate governance set up. In addition, the
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privatization or liquidation of remaining SOEs should not be allowed to slow, given the
contribution of privatized entities to export growth and higher foreign direct investment.
The Kosova C energy and mining project should be structured in line with international
best practice. A framework for Public Private Partnership should not result in any
contingencies for the budget and only burden the government with the risk it can control.

K. CONCLUSION
While the Fund’s mandate is as relevant today as it was in 1945, the first thing that is
worth of mentioning is that the world economy has undergone enormous change since the
IMF was established at the end of the WW II. In fact, in todays rapidly integrating global
economy, the maintenance of international financial stability is even more important than
it was in those early days. I’m saying this based on the fact that today IMF has more than
five times as many members as when it started out.
As the world economy has evolved, so did the International Monetary Fund. All member
states have learned a great deal about how economies function and about how best to
achieve sustained rapid growth, raise living standards, and reduce poverty. If we carefully
notice the period after 1990’s, IMF has attached greater importance to sound fiscal
policies and sustainable debt levels, by appreciating the central role that financial sector
plays in fostering growth, and by knowing that flexible exchange rate regimes enable
economies more easily to adjust the shocks. But, in many low income countries (e.g.
Kosova) policies discourage businesses and enterprises. Property rights are often difficult
to enforce and in many cases weak judicial systems make contract enforcement virtually
impossible. In recent years IMF realized that such issues need to be addressed if a
macroeconomic framework is to be sustainable.
Of course that macroeconomic stability is important for the low income members while it
has become increasingly apparent over these years. Most of the poorer countries that have
put in place policies to reduce inflation and crate the conditions for growth have
experienced higher growth rates (always with the IMF’s advices and encouragements).
Unfortunately, except the “advantages” of the IMF mentioned in the above paragraphs,
the International Monetary Fund has problems and difficulties. The problems that exist
in the IMF are only the most extreme version of a problem that exists in all international
organizations. The IMF is suffering from serious structural distortions that have slowly
developed since the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement. These problems
create a substantial barrier to the effective functioning by the IMF.
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They can only be corrected through a broad ranging reform program that will overhaul
the structure and operating principles of the IMF. Without undertaking this reform
program, it is unclear if the IMF will ever be able to effectively make any useful
contributions to solving the complex problems of poverty, inequality and inadequate
governance which plague developing countries today.
Despite the fact that the path of Kosova’s transition was and continues to be not an easy
one, Kosova has experienced a higher growth as well. In a complex and unique political
situation in which Kosova finds itself, it is a general impression that a lot has been
achieved as far as creating institutions and policies. However, there is still a long way to
go.
Based on IMF’ recommendations, Government objectives and current necessities, the
study concluded that there is an immediate need to:
- reduce the unacceptably high level of unemployment,
- focus on reconstruction, private investment, import-competing, export sectors,
privatizing socially owned enterprises, and support the overall improvement in
competitiveness,
- adjust economy costs in line with its underlying productivity, limit the growth of
budgetary wage bill, redeploy the size of civil service with the aim of reducing it,
improve physical infrastructure, and to rise human capital,
- improve fiscal policy management, cut the deficit of KCB (not to exceed 3% of
GDP), maintain low rate of tax regime, provide more effectively the
administration of social transfers in line with initial intention of providing a safety
net for those most in need ( disability pensions, the war invalid benefit, and the
early retirement benefit for minors),
- implement monitoring system ensuring tighter allocation of budget, to enhance
non-tax revenue,
- improve the effectiveness of the public investment program (PIP), and
information in donor coordination statistics,
- privatize all the total assets of SOE by KTA (mainly based on the client plan for
the future development of the social enterprise to be privatized) , and to improve
the governance of public enterprises (such as: PTK and Prishtina International
Airport).
- Moreover, pending the assignment of an international dialing code( second
mobile operator), so the tendency to avoid possibilities for monopolistic behavior
must be high.
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- strengthen the regulatory and supervisory abilities, introduce more forewordlooking approach in assessing the risks facing the banking system, and to create a
more comprehensive financial statistics.
The above mentioned points show also the IMF’s role in Kosova, which is to be
appreciated with respect to the fact that it has strengthen the capacity in both human and
institutional resources, designed appropriate macroeconomic policy, tax policy, revenue
administration, expenditure management, financial sector sustainability, more specifically
it has assisted in policies relating to the government’s budget, the management of money
and credit, government and consumer spending, business investment, exports and
imports, output (GDP), employment and inflation, financial sector policies, including the
regulation and supervision of banks and other financial institutions, and structural
policies that affect macroeconomic performance, such as those governing labor markets,
the energy sector and trade, which all reflects to a possible better balance of payments.
I can conclude that the Fund’s unique thing is the cross- country perspective that has
significant advantages when helping countries address their economic policy needs.
Finally, we also have the possibility to notice the changing role of the IMF, especially in
its PRGF, HIPC and MDRI programs when thinking in the context of what initially IMF
was supposed to do.
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